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Complete Home and Office Legal Guide (Chestnut) (1993).ISO
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JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.
The various opinions in this case portray quite clearly the dif-
ficult, indeed agonizing, questions that are presented by the
constantly increasing power of science to keep the human body
alive for longer than any reasonable person would want to inhabit
it. The States have begun to grapple with these problems through
legislation. I am concerned, from the tenor of today's opinions,
that we are poised to confuse that enterprise as successfully as
we have confused the enterprise of legislating concerning
abortion--requiring it to be conducted against a background of
federal constitutional imperatives that are unknown because they
are being newly crafted from Term to Term. That would be a great
misfortune.
While I agree with the Court's analysis today, and therefore
join in its opinion, I would have preferred that we announce,
clearly and promptly, that the federal courts have no business in
this field; that American law has always accorded the State the
power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide--including sui-
cide by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to
preserve one's life; that the point at which life becomes
``worthless,'' and the point at which the means necessary to
preserve it become ``extraordinary'' or ``inappropriate,'' are
neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Jus-
tices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people
picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory; and
hence, that even when it is demonstrated by clear and convincing
--
evidence that a patient no longer wishes certain measures to be
taken to preserve her life, it is up to the citizens of Missouri
to decide, through their elected representatives, whether that
wish will be honored. It is quite impossible (because the Con-
stitution says nothing about the matter) that those citizens will
decide upon a line less lawful than the one we would choose; and
it is unlikely (because we know no more about ``life-and-death''
than they do) that they will decide upon a line less reasonable.
The text of the Due Process Clause does not protect individuals
against deprivations of liberty simpliciter. It protects them
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against deprivations of liberty ``without due process of law.''
To determine that such a deprivation would not occur if Nancy
Cruzan were forced to take nourishment against her will, it is
unnecessary to reopen the historically recurrent debate over
whether ``due process'' includes substantive restrictions. Com-
pare Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How.
------ - ------ ------- ---- --- ----------- --
272 (1856), with Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 450 (1857); com-
----- --------
pare Tyson & Bro. v. United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc., 273
----- --- ------ ------- ------ ------- ---
U. S. 418 (1927), with Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Refer-
----- -------- -- --- ------- ------
ence & Bond Assn., Inc., 313 U. S. 236, 246-247 (1941); compare
---- ---- ---- ---
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963), with Moore v. East
-------- ------ ----- ----
Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); see Easter-
---------
brook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 S. Ct. Rev. 85; Monaghan,
Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 353 (1981). It is
at least true that no ``substantive due process'' claim can be
maintained unless the claimant demonstrates that the State has
deprived him of a right historically and traditionally protected
against State interference. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S.
------- - ------ -
----, ---- (1989) (plurality opinion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
------ --------
U. S. 186, 192 (1986); Moore, supra, at 502-503 (plurality opin-
----- -----
ion). That cannot possibly be established here.
At common law in England, a suicide--defined as one who ``deli-
berately puts an end to his own existence, or commits any unlaw-
ful malicious act, the consequence of which is his own death,'' 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *189--was criminally liable. Ibid.
----
Although the States abolished the penalties imposed by the common
law (i. e., forfeiture and ignominious burial), they did so to
- -
spare the innocent family, and not to legitimize the act. Case
law at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment generally held that
assisting suicide was a criminal offense. See Marzen, O'Dowd,
Crone, & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duquesne L.
Rev. 1, 76 (1985) (``In short, twenty-one of the thirty-seven
states, and eighteen of the thirty ratifying states prohibited
assisting suicide. Only eight of the states, and seven of the
ratifying states, definitely did not''); see also 1 F. Wharton,
Criminal Law 122 (6th rev. ed. 1868). The System of Penal Law
presented to the House of Representatives by Representative Liv-
ingston in 1828 would have criminalized assisted suicide. E.
Livingston, A System of Penal Law, Penal Code 122 (1828). The
Field Penal Code, adopted by the Dakota Territory in 1877, pros-
cribed attempted suicide and assisted suicide. Marzen, O'Dowd,
Crone, & Balch, 24 Duquesne L. Rev., at 76-77. And most States
that did not explicitly prohibit assisted suicide in 1868 recog-
nized, when the issue arose in the 50 years following the Four-
teenth Amendment's ratification, that assisted and (in some
cases) attempted suicide were unlawful. Id., at 77-100; 148-242
--
(surveying development of States' laws). Thus, ``there is no
significant support for the claim that a right to suicide is so
rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed `fundamental' or
`implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' '' Id., at 100
--
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937)).
----- -----------
Petitioners rely on three distinctions to separate Nancy
Cruzan's case from ordinary suicide: (1) that she is permanently
incapacited and in pain; (2) that she would bring on her death
not by any affirmative act but by merely declining treatment that
provides nourishment; and (3) that preventing her from effectuat-
ing her presumed wish to die requires violation of her bodily in-
tegrity. None of these suffices. Suicide was not excused even
when committed ``to avoid those ills which [persons] had not the
fortitude to endure.'' 4 Blackstone, supra, at *189. ``The life
-----
of those to whom life has become a burden--of those who are hope-
lessly diseased or fatally wounded--nay, even the lives of crimi-
nals condemned to death, are under the protection of the law,
equally as the lives of those who are in the full tide of life's
enjoyment, and anxious to continue to live.'' Blackburn v. State,
--------- -----
23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1873). Thus, a man who prepared a poison,
and placed it within reach of his wife, ``to put an end to her
suffering'' from a terminal illness was convicted of murder, Peo-
----
ple v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 198 N. W. 690, 693 (1920); the
--- -------
``incurable suffering of the suicide, as a legal question, could
hardly affect the degree of criminality . . . .'' Note, 30 Yale
L. J. 408, 412 (1921) (discussing Roberts). Nor would the im-
-------
minence of the patient's death have affected